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INTRODUCTION

Do not hide behind my choices. You need to face the fact that this
comes as result of YOUR CHOICES. Parents and teachers, you
fup. You have taught these kids to be gears and sheep... I
may have taken their lives and my own - but it was your doing.
Teachers, parents, LET THIS MASSACRE BE ON YOUR
SHOULDERS UNTIL THE DAY YOU DIE.'
These apocalyptic words were written by Eric Harris, one of
two assassins who carried out the deadliest school shooting in
United States history on April 20, 1999. A rash of shootings has
recently plagued school systems throughout America. In many
situations, minors took weapons from their parents or other relatives. However, parents may be liable regardless of from
where the children retrieved the weapons. In some jurisdictions, parents may be held legally liable for failing to anticipate
a child's violent acts.
This situation is simply a new twist on an old question:
whether or not parents can be held liable for the tortious acts of
their minor children. New York courts have had a unique approach to this problem. In general, they have answered in the
2
negative.
This comment is divided into seven parts. Section II, following this introduction, briefly explores the New York case history of broad parental immunity antecedent to the New York
Court of Appeals' decision in Holodook v. Spencer.3 This section
also discusses the historical development of the nonliability doctrine and the principles that shaped early case law. Section III
1. Karen Lowe, Police Cite Possible Suicide Note from Colorado Gunman,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 24, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2589663.

2. See, e.g., Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974); see also infra
Part III.B; but see Nolechek v. Gesuale, 385 N.E.2d 1268 (N.Y. 1978) (establishing
an exception to Holodook); see infra Part IV.
3. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 338.
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briefly addresses the two integral cases that led the Court of
Appeals to decide Holodook.4 The remainder of the section will
deal exclusively with Holodook v. Spencer and its justifications.
Section IV illustrates the major exceptions to the Holodook
principle, including exceptions for dangerous instruments 5 and
situations where a parent owes a duty to the world at large, not
just to the child. 6 Section V discusses New York's legislative
foray into the area of parental liability. 7 The case law illustrates the public policy reasons for the enactment of New York
General Obligations Law § 3-112, which holds parents liable for
certain acts of their minors. Section V also explores one judge's
8
virulent attack on the constitutionality of the statute.
Section VI of this comment presents an analytical inquiry.
This section explores a question that this author hopes will
never be asked: "What would happen if the Littleton, Colorado
tragedy had occurred in New York?" An alarming number of
school shootings have occurred recently; to date, New York has
been fortunate not to have had such a disaster. This comment
will apply the relevant facts in the Littleton tragedy to the New
York case law from the previous sections.
II.
A.

EARLY NEW YORK CASE LAW - BROAD
PARENTAL IMMUNITY

Liability Imposed Strictly Upon the ParentalRelationship

Venerable New York case law has established the longstanding precedent that parents are not liable for the torts of
4. See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969); Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972); see also infra Part III.A.
5. See, e.g., Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d 1268 (finding a parent's negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument to a child resulted in parental liability); see also
infra Part IV.B.
6. See Grivas v. Grivas, 496 N.Y.S.2d 757 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1985) (finding
that a mother had breached a duty of reasonable care owed to all by leaving a
running lawnmower unattended and accessible to children).
7. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 3-112 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999); see also
infra Part V.
8. See Owens v. Ivey, 525 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Rochester City Ct. 1988) (attacking
the imposition of absolute monetary liability on a parent for her daughter's actions). But see In re William George T., 599 A.2d 886 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992);
Rudnay v. Corbett, 374 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977), and Board of Educ. of
Piscataway Township v. Caffiero, 431 A.2d 799 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981) (determining
that similar statutes in other states are constitutional).
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their children merely because of the parent-child relationship. 9
An additional act is required to impose parental liability, for example, some participation by the parent in the unlawful act. 10
In addition, where a parent's negligence made it both possible
and probable for the child to cause the complained-of injury, a
parent may be held liable for an injury caused by the child."
This parental negligence, however, must consist of the omission
of a degree of care that ordinarily prudent people would deem
12
adequate in such a situation.
B.

Steinberg v. Cauchois - SituationalParentalLiability

In the 1937 case of Steinberg v. Cauchois, the Appellate Division Second Department set forth situations in which the law
would impute liability to parents for the torts of their children. 13
The situations included: (I) when a parent negligently entrusts
an instrument which, because of its nature, constitutes a danger in the hands of the child; (II) when a parent negligently entrusts an instrument which, although not inherently
dangerous, is likely to be put to dangerous use because of the
child's known propensities; and (III) where the parent is negligent because of his failure to reasonably restrain the child from
vicious conduct that imperils others when this parent knows of
14
the child's propensity to act in this way.
Steinberg highlighted two other situations in which parents
could be held liable: first, parents may be liable when there is a
master-servant relationship and the child acts within his accorded authority, and, second, a parent who participates in the
9. See Schultz v. Morrison, 154 N.Y.S. 257, 258 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1915)
(holding that mere parental relationship did not render father liable for son's negligence in causing an accident while driving father's car); see also McCarthy v.
Heiselman, 125 N.Y.S. 13, 15 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1910) (finding parents were not
liable for their son's conversion of money from his employer). However, it is argued by at least one judge that the New York legislature has predicated liability
upon the relationship between parent and child. See infra Part V.B; see also
Owens, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
10. See McCarthy, 125 N.Y.S. at 15.
11. See Schultz, 154 N.Y.S. at 259.
12. See Mangam v. Brooklyn R.R. Co., 38 N.Y. 455, 457 (1868) (holding that
parents could not be liable for child's injuries because parents had not failed to
exercise due care).
13. 293 N.Y.S. 147 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1937).
14. See id. at 149.
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child's tortious act, either by consenting to it, or by ratifying it
later and accepting the benefits of the act, may be liable. 15 A
further exception that imposes parental liability was introduced
by the Court of Appeals forty-one years later in Nolechek v.
Gesuale, discussed in Section IV.16
C. Steinberg Situations
Since Steinberg was handed down, New York courts have
consistently cited its ruling as establishing situations where
parents may be held liable for their minors' actions. 17 Case law
subsequent to Steinberg has illustrated situations where there
has been sufficient parental knowledge to impose liability upon
the parents. In 1950, the Appellate Division Second Department held in Agnesini v. Olsen that there was sufficient parental knowledge of a minor's fire-starting propensities to present
the issue of parental liability to the jury.1 8 In Agnesini, the
mother knew that her child had started fires on three previous
occasions; despite this, she still permitted him to play with
matches. 19 In Zuckerburg v. Munzer, the same court held that
there were sufficient facts stated to constitute a cause of action
against a parent. 20 Specifically, the complaint alleged that the
youth's parent knew of the child's tendency to commit assaults,21 did not disclose this to the plaintiff domestic employee, 22 and that the defendant parent allowed the child to
23
possess the bat used to assault the plaintiff.
15. See id.
16. See Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1271. The Court of Appeals held that parental liability can be premised upon a finding that a parent negligently entrusted a
dangerous instrument to his child. See discussion infra Part IV and notes 123-44.
17. Compare Agnesini v. Olsen, 100 N.Y.S.2d 338 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1950)
(finding a mother's knowledge of her son's tendency to start fires sufficient to impose parental liability), with Zuckerburg v. Munzer, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910, 910 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1950), Staruck v. County of Otsego, 138 N.Y.S.2d 385, 387 (App. Div.
3d Dep't 1955) (holding defendant county not liable for delinquent child shooting
plaintiff, despite county's custody of the child), and Sherri v. Gerwell, 691 N.Y.S.2d
144, 145 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1999) (holding that because Steinberg thresholds had
not been crossed, the parents were not held liable).
18. See Agnesini, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
19. See id.
20. See Zuckerburg, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
21. See id. at 910.
22. See id. at 910-11.
23. See id. at 911.
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In 1957, the First Department decided Carmona v. Padilla,
where a grandmother who essentially raised her grandchild
was found negligent for the acts of the child. 24 The defendant
grandmother showed her grandson where the boy's father had
hidden a bow and arrow, despite the father's having admonished the child against using the toy.25 The grandson shot the
infant plaintiff in the eye on the grandmother's porch, and the
grandmother was found to have acted with affirmative negligence. 26 Liability was premised upon the fact that the grandmother had substantial supervision over the child, especially in
her own home - this special circumstance vested the grandmother with the authority, and the responsibility, to monitor
27
her grandson's conduct.
D. Problems in Applying Steinberg
New York courts have had difficulty applying these Steinberg principles. 28 It is unclear from subsequent case law just
how specific parental knowledge of an infant's violent propensities must be in order to impute liability. 29 In addition, some
subsequent case law has gone so far as to limit "the impact of
30
Steinberg ... to its facts."
In 1955, the Appellate Division Third Department practically required omniscience in order to impose parental liability
24. See Carmona v. Padilla, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 745 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1957).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 743.
27. See id.
28. See Staruck v. County of Otsego, 138 N.Y.S.2d 385, 387 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1955); see also Linder v. Bidner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1966); Adolph E. v. Linda M., 566 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1991).
29. See Adolph E., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (holding that even if defendant parents had knowledge of a perverse game their daughter played with her own broth-

ers, this would not constitute notice that she would engage in harmful sexual
conduct with a child for whom she babysat); Staruck, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 385 (holding

that parents had notice and the ability to control the dangerous propensity of their
son to beat up small children because they were frequently notified by neighbors of
his actions); Armour v. England, 619 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1994)

(holding that parents had no knowledge of their daughter's alleged tendency to
injure others when no one had ever notified them of such conduct).
30. Bodaness v. Staten Island Aid, 544 N.Y.S. 2d 115, 117 (Sup. Ct. Richmond

County 1989).
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in Staruck v. County of Otsego.31 The State of New York, in loco
parentis,was found not liable for the acts of a known "problem
32
child" who shot the plaintiff with a rifle that he had stolen.
The court noted that the infant had been a problem child for an
extended period of time. 33 The child had appeared before the
Children's Court, received an extensive psychiatric examination, stayed in three different boarding houses over five months,
and was disorderly at each one. 34 Assuming arguendo that the
court believed that the defendant was a known delinquent, the
court held that in order to hold the State liable, the proof must
indicate to a reasonable mind that such a delinquent could actually shoot another person. 35 The evidence presented by the
36
plaintiff failed to make such a showing.
In Littenberg v. McNamara, bare allegations that parents
knew or should have known of their seven year-old's propensity
to throw rocks were held insufficient to impute liability, even
after the child had hit the plaintiff with a rock.3 7 This holding
required the plaintiff to allege specific facts supporting allegations, rather than "an unmentioned assumption or a cautious
innuendo" of a possible propensity that may or may not have
been known by the parent. 3 The Queens County Supreme
Court in Linder v. Bidner found a viable cause of action against
a defendant's parents who "with full knowledge of the disposition, habit, and traits of their son permitted him to go at large
... without guidance ... where minor children were playing...
and with his fists assault the plaintiff ....
Unlike Staruck,
where there had been formal knowledge of a child's conduct, the
defendant parents in Linder were charged with knowledge of
their son's activities because they were "frequently notified by
complaining neighbors" of their child's "vicious and malignant
disposition and ... [his] habit of mauling, pummeling, assault"39

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
County
38.
39.

See Staruck, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
See id. at 387.
See id. at 386-87.
See id. at 386.
See id. at 387.
See Staruck, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
See Littenberg v. McNamara, 136 N.Y.S.2d 178, 181 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
1954).
See id.
Linder, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29.
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ing, and mistreating smaller children."40 In contrast, when parents have never been notified by anyone, including school
officials, of their infant's vicious or violent behavior, the parents
41
will not be held liable.
Although the cases vary, one caveat is certain in deriving a
standard rule from the case precedents: broad, nonspecific parental knowledge of an infant's conduct is insufficient to impute
liability. In Knopf v. Muntz, the parents simply had knowledge
that their child played in the street with other children. 42 The
court held that this alone did not give rise to liability when
these children, while playing football on the street, knocked
43
down and injured the plaintiff.
Using reasoning similar to Staruck, the most recent case in
this evolving area held a parent not liable. 44 In Sherri v.
Gerwell, the infant defendant gave the keys to his mother's car
to another defendant, without his mother's knowledge or permission. 45 The two boys then drove the car and picked up the
plaintiff, who sustained injuries in a subsequent accident. 46
The complaint alleged that the mother of the defendant negligently supervised her son by placing her car keys in an area
accessible to him, knowing that he had a propensity to disobey
rules. 47 However, the Appellate Division Second Department
declined to find the mother liable without proof that she had
specific knowledge of the defendant's propensity to "utilize automobiles without permission, or to steal or borrow items which
he was not authorized to use." 48 The court clearly followed the
reasoning of Staruck, pushing the knowledge requirement to
40. Id. at 428.
41. See Armour, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 807. In Armour, the court noted that, in
addition to the parent's ignorance of their daughter's conduct, the daughter testified that she had "never been the subject of a restraining order for violent behavior," and that disciplinary action had only been taken against her on one previous
occasion. Id.
42. See Knopfv. Muntz, 121 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952).
43. See id. at 424.
44. See Staruck, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
45. Sherri, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.; see also Gore v. Mackie, 718 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
2000) (holding that defendant had established as a matter of law lack of knowledge
of minor daughter's propensity to use automobiles without permission).
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the bounds of specificity. Thus, the court found that liability
49
did not attach to the defendant mother.
Even when parents have actual knowledge of specific conduct, that knowledge is not necessarily sufficient to impute parental knowledge of an infant's behaviors.50 The parents in
Adolph E. v. Linda M. were held not liable for their daughter's
sexual misconduct with a child she babysat, even though they
were aware of her perverse sexual behavior with her own brothers. 51 The defendant mother told the plaintiffs mother during a
telephone conversation that she was aware of a game where
"their daughter, wrapped in a towel but otherwise naked, asked
her brothers to chase her. . land on the bed and ...have the
boys jump on top of her and try to pull the towel off."52 The
Appellate Division Fourth Department essentially required
knowledge tantamount to that in Staruck to hold the parents
liable for their daughter's actions. The court reasoned that,
even if the defendants had such prior knowledge, it would not
"constitute notice that their daughter had a propensity to engage in harmful sexual conduct with a child for whom she was
babysitting ...."53
The Court of Appeals' most recent decision in this area was
handed down in 1997. In LaTorre v. Genesee Management, the
court held that a shopping mall management company could
not maintain a third-party action against a developmentally
disabled individual's mother for negligent supervision. 54 In LaTorre, a mother left her disabled son unattended in the arcade
area of a mall, where he became involved in an altercation with
other patrons. 55 The defendant's security guards were forced to
physically subdue and restrain the disabled son. 56 The plaintiff
and his mother instituted an action against the mall management company for resultant physical and psychological injuries.57 In response, the shopping mall management company
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Sherri, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
See, e.g., Littenberg, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
See Adolph E., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
Id.
Id.
See LaTorre v. Genesee Management, 687 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (N.Y. 1997).
See id. at 1284.
See id.
See id.
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brought a third-party action against the plaintiffs mother for
negligence. 5 8 This action was unsuccessful because of the general allegations of the complaint, combined with the Court's
finding it unreasonable to charge parents of disabled children
with "rebound liability, flowing from a child's or adult's natural
deficits or personal qualities." 59 Furthermore, the Court also
held that parental negligence must be "alleged and pleaded
60
with some reasonable specificity, beyond mere generalities."
The Court promulgated a rule that "[s]ome knowledge of a specific type of pertinently dangerous characteristics and particularly foreseeable conduct might find a theoretical tort construct
to support recognition of some liability."6 1 The Court held that
the allegations were devoid of the requisite specificity. 62 The
courts have continued to apply the reasoning in Staruck requiring parents to have a highly particular knowledge of a child's
dangerous characteristics before imposing liability upon defen63
dant parents.
III.

HOLODOOK v. SPENCER AND ITS PROGENY - THE
CASES THAT DISTINGUISH NEW YORK

A.

Setting the Stage

Two integral cases laid the groundwork for the New York
Court of Appeals' decision in Holodook v. Spencer in favor of parental nonliability. In 1972, the Court of Appeals held in Dole v.
Dow Chemical Company that liability must be apportioned between the prime defendant and third parties when a third party
is deemed negligent for part of the damages. 64 This right to an
apportionment of liability should rest on the relative responsibilities of the parties involved and should be determined from
58. See LaTorre, 687 N.E.2d at 1284.
59. Id. at 1287.
60. Id. at 1288. For a case that found the parents' negligence actionable, see
Cooper v. County of Rensselaer, 697 N.Y.S.2d 486, 491-92 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer
County 1999) (holding that when the parents were made aware of the danger their
child faced, but still took steps to expose the child anyway, the parents' negligence
was actionable).
61. LaTorre, 687 N.E.2d at 1287.
62. See id.
63. See Staruck, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
64. See Dole, 282 N.E.2d at 292.
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the facts of the case. 65 In essence, Dole "enlarged the availabil66
ity of apportionment among joint tort-feasors."
In Gelbman v. Gelbman, the New York Court of Appeals
overruled three earlier cases - Sorrentino v. Sorrentino,67 Cannon v. Cannon,68 and Badigian v. Badigian69 - and found that
intrafamilial suits were permissible. 70 Writing the opinion in
Gelbman, Judge Burke concurred with Judge Fuld's dissent in
Badigian by summarizing Fuld's arguments for the abolition of
the immunity rule as such: "[Tihe doctrine does not apply if the
child is of legal age ... the tolling provisions of the Civil Practice Law and Rules ...seem to protect the right of the child to
maintain the action upon reaching majority. The doctrine is
71
also inapplicable where the suit is for property damage."
Thus, Gelbman abrogated the former defense of intrafamilial
immunity. 72 Together, these two cases led the Court of Appeals
in Holodook to "specify the breadth of the path . . .ventured
upon in Gelbman, and to define its intersection with . . . the
long, winding road of Dole."73 The substantial impact of this
74
case has led to much academic writing on the subject.
65. See id. at 295.
66. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 340.
67. 162 N.E. 551 (N.Y. 1928).
68. 40 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1942).
69. 174 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1961).
70. See Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at 194.
71. Id. at 193.
72. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 340. This defense essentially barred suits by
minors against their parents for nonwillful torts. See also Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at
194. This bar was supported by the public policies of discouraging fraudulent
claims and preserving familial unity. See id. at 192-93 (citing Badigian, 174
N.E.2d at 719).
73. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 340.
74. See Gail D. Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine In Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 517 (1982); see also Case Comment, Torts Parents and Child, 42 BROOK L. REV. 125 (1975) (criticizing the reasoning in
Holodook). After an in-depth look at Gelbman and Dole, other states' rulings are
distinguished by Torts - Parentand Child. The criticism alleges that "[wihat was
thought to be 'intolerable' in California will, indeed, be tolerated in New York." Id.
at 139. The Holodook reasoning is considered "anomalous," id. at 141, "counter to
the tort goal of deterring wrongdoing," id. at 143, and, generally, "cannot withstand scrutiny." Id. at 140. See also Note, The "ReasonableParent"Standard:An
Alternative to Parent-ChildTort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 811 (1976).
For a fairly neutral reading of the Holodook case and its reasoning, see Dale M.
Thuillez, ParentalNonsupervision:The Tort That Never Was, 40 ALB. L. REV. 336
(1976).
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The Underlying Facts of Holodook

Three cases were combined in the Court of Appeals'
Holodook verdict since each case raised the same issue: whether
parents may be held liable for a failure to adequately supervise
a child. 75 One of the cases, Graney v. Graney, involved a suit by
an infant and his guardian ad litem against his father, who was
allegedly negligent in permitting his son to fall from the steps of
a slide on a school playground. 76 It was also alleged that the
father failed to give adequate supervision or warning to the
child. 77 In the other case, Fahey v. Ryan, a three-year old infant's hand was run over by an eight year old neighbor who was
operating a power-driven lawnmower. 78 The injured, by his father, sued his mother for negligently failing to supervise, warn,
and protect him. 79 Finally, the third case, Holodook v. Spencer,
came to the attention of the court in the posture of Dole, as a
third-party action for indemnification and apportionment of responsibility against the infant plaintiffs mother for negligently
failing to instruct, control, and maintain her child.8 0 The
Holodook infant was struck by the defendant's automobile when
he ran out between two parked cars.8 1
In deciding Holodook, the Court of Appeals briefly reviewed
the historically non-actionable tort of negligent supervision and
discussed Gelbman and its implications.8 2 The majority concluded that negligent parental supervision would continue to be
non-actionable by a child.8 3 The majority contended that it
could "conceive of few, if any, accidental injuries to children
which could not have been prevented . .. by keener parental
guidance .... "8 4 Essentially, the majority felt that any parent
could potentially be hailed into court to answer for his or her
conduct toward the child. 85
75. See id. at 339.
76. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 340.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 340-41.
80. See id. at 341.
81. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 341.
82. See id. at 341-43.
83. See id. at 346.
84. Id. at 343.
85. See id.
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The court resurrected several policy considerations that
gave vitality to the prior immunity rule. 6 For instance, when
there is a lack of insurance coverage, Holodook would prevent
family discord and preserve the familial resources for all members.8 7 In this instance, if a recovery is made against a parent,
the injured child is essentially victimized, because, in most
cases, families are "a single economic unit."8 8 The resultant diminished recovery and strain on family relations are results
that the court wanted to avoid.8 9 In addition, when there is insurance coverage, there exists the inherent danger of fraud and
collusion between the child and his or her parents. 90 The court
also feared that allowing Dole apportionment might lead some
parents to forego legal redress on their child's behalf against
third parties who are more likely than the parent to have the
appropriate liability coverage. 91 The majority also pointed out
that General Obligations Law § 3-111 clarifies the New York
legislature's unwillingness to diminish or bar a child's recovery
against a third party because of a parent's failure to provide
adequate supervision. 92 Section 3-111, at the time of the decision, read: "the contributory negligence of the infant's parent
93
shall not be imparted to the infant."
...
In its lengthy opinion, the Holodook Court acknowledged
that other states including Hawaii, Wisconsin, and California
had recognized the duty to supervise. 94 The court also decided
that, contrary to most tort cases, the "reasonable man" standard
95
was not the wisest course to take in parent-child relations.
Parents have a wide range of discretion in how to supervise
their children. There are a plethora of different educational, economic, ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds from which
86. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 343-44.
87. See id. at 343.
88. Id. at 344.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 343.
91. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 343.
92. See id. at 345.
93. Id. At the time, the statute was enacted to legislatively nullify case precedent which "allowed a jury to consider a defense in bar of contributory negligence
on the part of a plaintiff child by imputing to the child the negligence of the parent
in failing to provide reasonable supervision." Id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 346.
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parents may derive their values. 96 For this reason, the court
stated that "[s]upervision is uniquely a matter for the exercise
97
of judgment."
As a result of the holding in Holodook, the infant plaintiffs
in Graney and Ryan did not have a cause of action against their
parents for negligent supervision. 98 The oft-cited precedent set
by Holodook is derived, however, from the disposition of the
Holodook child's case. The defendant in Holodook v. Spencer
had brought a counterclaim for Dole apportionment and contribution against the plaintiff father, alleging negligent supervision. 99 The defendant's secondary right to contribution
depended upon the parent's alleged failure to perform some
duty that was owed to the plaintiff child.' 0 0 The counterclaim
and third-party complaint were both defeated in Holodook because of the absence of the primary cause of action. 10 1 In other
words, the Court of Appeals refused to allow the Holodook infant to maintain an action against his mother or father for negligent supervision. This is the most commonly cited authority
from the Holodook case, and the finding that sets New York
apart from the majority of jurisdictions.
IV.
A.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE HOLODOOK RULE

Limiting and DistinguishingHolodook

Subsequent case law has reinforced and further developed
the justifications for the Holodook rule. 0 2 However, case law
96. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 341.
100. See id. at 346.
101. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346.
102. See, e.g., Russo v. Osofsky, 492 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1985) (holding that the trial court erred in instructing jury to consider "whether
the plaintiff mother negligently supervised the infant plaintiff in determining liability"); Middleton v. Village of Nichols, 452 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (Sup. Ct. Tioga
County 1982) (noting the difficulty of placing restrictions on the extent of the supervisory right of the parents). See also Zikely v. Zikely, 470 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1983). Zikely reiterates Holodook's concern that the courts refrain
from second-guessing parents' discretion in raising their children. See id. at 34;
see also Lampman v. Cairo Sch. Dist., 366 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. Greene County
1975) (restating that the parent's duty to protect his or her child from injury goes
to the heart of a family relationship).
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has also limited the applicability of the general rule in
Holodook. 10 3 For instance, the general rule in Holodook does
not apply when a plaintiff is asserting his rights against a defendant's parents. 10 4 The infant plaintiff in Pico v. Canini
sought to implicate the infant defendant's father for failing to
provide proper parental supervision. 0 5 The court realized that
Holodook did not apply because Holodook dealt with the rights
of an infant against his own parents. 0 6 The Appellate Division
Second Department granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
based on the plaintiffs failure to allege a proper Steinberg situ10 7
ation where the parent could be held liable.
New York courts have deliberated whether or not the general rule of nonliability should be extended to those who are the
temporary caretakers of the child. As a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court of Sullivan County held in Rider v.
Speaker that a babysitter could be liable for negligent supervision when an infant under her care suffered injuries. 08 The defendant babysitter neglected to put the infant in a child seat,
and the infant suffered injuries in a subsequent auto accident. 10 9 Although the babysitter had assumed temporary control and responsibility for the infant, and was the infant's
custodian at the time of the accident, the court did not want to
extend parental immunity for such a temporary entrustment. 110
The Court held that the babysitter "donned the mantle of temporary custodian of the infant""' and that she had a duty to use
reasonable care to safeguard the child. 11 2 However, this duty
13
could not be measured by the duty imposed upon a parent."
103. See generally Russo, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 623; Middleton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at
157; Zikely, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 33; Lampman, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 579; Pico v. Canini,
367 N.Y.S.2d 304 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975).
104. See Pico, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 306.
108. See Rider v. Speaker, 692 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County
1999).
109. See id. at 921.
110. See id. at 923.
111. Id.
112. See Rider, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
113. See id.
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Likewise, two other decisions have declined to extend parental nonliability to grandparents who had custodial care of
infants who suffered injuries. 114 According to Barrerav. General Electric Company, these individuals are outside of the parent-child relationship, and are to be judged according to
"standards applicable to the reasonable man."1 15 The Barrera
court deemed the relationship between a grandparent and a
grandchild to be sufficiently different from the parent-child relationship; thus, this more detached relationship requires a different set of legal obligations. 116 However, this heightened
standard does not apply when the grandparental relationship to
the child is a Potemkin village 1 7 for the parental relationship.
In other words, where the grandparent or other relative places
himself or herself in loco parentis to the child, Holodook will
protect this relative. 118 In summary, the Holodook principle
will only apply in the parent-child relationship, to the exclusion
of the traditional relationship a child has with grandparents,
uncles, aunts, or any other relatives of the infant."19
It is important to understand that the Holodook rule bars
recovery for negligent supervision only when the injury to the
infant results from the breach of a duty that is owed solely to
the infant. New York courts will recognize a viable cause of action in favor of an infant against his parent when a parent
"breaches a duty owed to the world at large."'120 In addition, this
114. See Costello v. Marchese, 524 N.Y.S.2d 232 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1988)
(failing to broaden the scope of parental immunity to include the grandfather of
the injured infant). See also Barrera v. General Elec. Co., 378 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1975).
115. Barrera,378 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
116. See id. at 240.
117. 2

THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCI-

2309 (1993 ed.) ("Any of a number of sham villages reputedly built on
Potemkin's orders for Catherine II's tour of the Crimea in 1787; transf. any sham
or unreal thing.").
118. See, e.g., Barrera,378 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
119. See id.
120. Ruffing v. Union Carbide Corp., 720 N.Y.S. 2d 328, 332 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 2000) (quoting Hurst v. Titus, 432 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1980)); see also Burgess v. Cappola, 674 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1998) (rejecting defendant landlord's contention that the plaintiff tenants
owed a duty to the "world at large" to prevent infant children from falling through
their windows).
PLEs
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"world at large" theory is available to impose liability upon par121
ents for contribution or indemnification.
The largest abrogation of Holodook occurred when the New
York Court of Appeals revisited the nonliability issue four years
later. In Nolechek v. Gesuale, the New York Court of Appeals
limited Holodook by carving out an exception to its rule. 122 The
Nolechek court held that an alleged tortfeasor may seek indemnity or contribution from the injured child's parent when the
child's injuries, and the tortfeasor's liability, resulted from the
parent's negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument to
the child. 23 The plaintiff administrator in Nolechek gave his
son, the decedent, a motorcycle. 24 The decedent did not have
an operator's license, was blind in one eye, had impaired vision
in the other eye, and suffered irremediably poor long distance
vision. 2 5 The motorcycle was neither registered nor inspected. 26 The decedent and his friend, James Neiman,
switched motorcycles with one another and then went driving. 127 The decedent was killed when he ran into a suspended
steel cable that the defendant, a sand and gravel company, had
used to close off the road on which the decedent and his friend
had been riding. 128 The case came before the Court of Appeals
by way of the defendant's appeal from the Appellate Division's
dismissal of their counterclaim. 29 The plaintiff likewise crossappealed from the Appellate Division's dismissal of his thirdparty complaint against James Neiman and his father, for pro30
viding the instrument of young Nolechek's death.
The defendants argued that a motorcycle is a "dangerous
instrument," especially in the hands of a visually disabled
child.' 3' Although the court rejected this "dangerous instru121. See Burgess, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (quoting McNamara v. Banney, 672

N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1998)).
122. See Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1268.
123. See id. at 1274.
124. See id. at 1271.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1271.
128. See id. Defendants in the action included Thomas Gesuale, Star Sand
and Gravel Co., Inc., and others. See id. at 1270.
129. See id. at 1270.
130. See id. at 1271.
131. See id.

17

458

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:441

ment exception" to Holodook as "neither analytically persuasive
nor practically sound," 13 2 the court decided the case on a different legal relationship from that which existed in Holodook.
Holodook addressed the responsibilities a parent owes to a
child, while Nolechek premised the parental responsibility upon
the duty to shield third parties from their infant's improvident
133
use of dangerous instruments.
The Court acknowledged that Nolechek did not involve the
parental duty to prevent children from injuring themselves by
the use of dangerous instruments. 3 4 Furthermore, the direct
physical injury that infants cause to third parties was not at
issue. The harm involved in Nolechek was the "financial harm
resulting from potential liability of a 'concurrent' tortfeasor for
35
the child's death while using the dangerous instrument."
Nolechek established that there is an exception to the general
rule of parental nonliability when parents have negligently permitted their child to use a dangerous instrument, based upon
the parents' breach of an established duty to third persons who
36
may be harmed.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he sound
rule of the Holodook case survives only if accompanied by sound
exceptions.' ' 3 7 The Court reinstated the defendants' counterclaim and dismissed the plaintiffs third-party claim against the
Neimans, ruling that the switching of the motorcycles was not a
proximate cause of the fatal accident. 138 In essence, the court
would not allow Mr. Nolechek to escape the defendants' counterclaim against him for contribution when he let his son, with
such impaired vision, ride a motorcycle. 39 The father's actions,
in entrusting his infant with a dangerous instrument, created a
danger to all of society, for which he was partially liable. 40 A
parent owes a duty to third parties to protect them from their
child's improvident use of a dangerous instrument, especially if
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1271.
See id. at 1271-72.
See id. at 1273.
Id. at 1272.
See id. at 1273.
Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1274.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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the parent is aware of and can control the use of the dangerous
instrument. 141 Therefore, what constitutes a dangerous instrument for the purposes of the Nolechek exception must be
determined.
B.

Sex Toys & Seesaws - Dangerous Instruments?

The Nolechek decision mandates that there must be a dangerous instrument in order to impute negligence to a parent
under the prescribed exception to Holodook. 42 Furthermore,
the parental duty applies particularly "when the parent is
aware of and capable of controlling its use." 43 If neither parent
is cognizant that his child possessed a dangerous instrument,
nor aware of how he obtained it, the parents are not charged
with knowledge of the situation.'4' However, if the infant's use
of the instrument is open and notorious, regardless of the parents' claimed ignorance, the parents will be deemed to have ac45
tual knowledge.
Parental knowledge of a child's possession of a dangerous
instrument may also be established by sufficient circumstantial
evidence, despite the parent's professions of ignorance. 46 Such
circumstantial evidence might include the child's open and notorious possession of the instrument, the fact that the family
lived in a small apartment, and that both parents believed that
their child was always truthful with them, and that they were
aware of all his belongings. 1 47 The fact that a mother does all of
the housework has even been considered a factor in charging
parents with knowledge, especially since a mother's cleaning
141. See id. at 1271.
142. See Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1272.
143. Id.
144. See Gordon v. Harris, 448 N.Y.S.2d 598, 600 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1982)
(holding the affidavits and depositions of the infant defendant's parents legally
sufficient to establish that neither could be charged with awareness of or liability
for their son's use of an air rifle to injure the infant defendant).
145. See, e.g., Kuchlik v. Feuer, 267 N.Y.S. 256, 259 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1933)
(holding it sufficient to charge the parents with knowledge of their child's activities
when neighbors had seen the infant defendant in the street with the instrument,
an air rifle, on previous occasions).
146. See id. at 259 (quoting Woloszynowski v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 172
N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930)).
147. See id. at 258-60.
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would reveal the presence of a dangerous instrument. 148 If a
parent sets a chain of events in motion by entrusting a dangerous instrument to his infant, even if this direct act does not
cause the injury, the parent may be held liable. 149 Furthermore,
neither a parent nor his infant must necessarily have owned the
dangerous instrument in order to impute knowledge. It is sufficient if the parent knew of the child's possession and permitted
its use. 150
If an infant defendant conceals the instrument from his or
her parents and is not living with them at the time of the incident, a parent's claim of ignorance may be bolstered. 15 1 The evidence that these cases turn upon, however, seems to be
narrowly tailored. In an old case, Ship v. Fridenburg,a defendant parent was held non-negligent when his son shot a home
nurse with a loaded revolver. 152 The Appellate Division First
Department explained that the loaded revolver was not owned
by the defendant, nor was it in his room, nor did he set the revolver in the bureau where it was found.'5 3 The Court held that
the shooting was an accident which was not the reasonable, natural, and probable result of forseeable circumstances, such that
154
the negligence could be imputed to the parent.
It is well settled that if the parent has knowledge of the
infant's use of the dangerous instrument, and consents to such
use, the parent can be found actively negligent. 155 In Frellesen
v. Colburn, the defendant father was found to lack the requisite
knowledge of his son's possession of a gun when the son shot
148. See id.

149. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Bello, 357 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1974). The plaintiff father in Wheeler allegedly entrusted an air gun to his infant,
who gave the gun to the infant defendant, who, in turn, shot the infant plaintiff in
the eye. See id. at 820.
150. See Len v. City of Cohoes, 534 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1988); see also Kuchlik, 267 N.Y.S. at 259.
151. See Len, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
152. See Ship v. Fridenburg, 117 N.Y.S. 599, 601 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1909).
153. See id.; see also, e.g., Napiearlski v. Pickering, 106 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30-31
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1951) (finding father not negligent because he kept a rifle and
ammunition hidden from his infant son, who found the instruments and used the
rifle to shoot another infant). The Court noted that the facts of Napiearlskidid not
fit into any of the Steinberg situations. See id. at 30.
154. See Ship, 117 N.Y.S. at 600.
155. See Sullivan v. O'Ryan, 132 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1954).
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and killed the plaintiffs "coon" hunting dog with the defendant's gun. 15 6 The defendant hung up the unloaded gun in the
house, kept the shells elsewhere, and denied knowing the child
had ever used a gun. 157 The Appellate Division Fourth Department even found an infant non-negligent, but his father negli158
gent when he entrusted a BB gun to the infant.
New York case law provides for specific objects that have
been deemed to be dangerous instruments. When determining
whether an instrument is dangerous, relevant considerations
include "the nature and complexity of the alleged dangerous instrument, the age, intelligence and experience of the child, and
his proficiency with the instrument." 159 It has been well established that a motorcycle is a dangerous instrument, 160 especially
in the hands of a boy with impaired vision. 16' Similarly, a motorized bicycle entrusted to a twelve-year-old has been termed a
1 62
"dangerous contraption."
An air rifle, 163 a loaded revolver, 6 4 and a gun 6 5 are obviously dangerous instruments. Guns are always considered dangerous instruments, regardless of their power, operability, or
ownership. 66 Courts have held air guns to be dangerous, 167 a
significant fact when the third party defendant allegedly loans
or gives the weapon to the shooter. 168 BB guns have been
deemed to be dangerous instruments as well.1 69 Even a toy
156. See Frellesen v. Colburn, 281 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (Tioga County Ct. 1935).

157. See id. at 473.
158. See Lichtenthal v. Gawoski, 354 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1974).

159. Lamica v. Pecore, 709 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000) (citing
Botillo v. Poette, 544 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1989)).
160. See Len, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
161. See, e.g., Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1274 (holding father liable for entrust-

ing vision-impaired son with motorcycle resulting in son's death).
162. Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1970).
163. See Wheeler, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
164. See Ship, 117 N.Y.S. at 600.
165. See Napiearlski, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
166. See Wheeler, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 821-22; Gordon, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 598; Sullivan, 132 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
167. See Wheeler, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 821 (quoting 109 N.Y. JUR. § 4 (1993)).
168. See Sullivan, 132 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
169. See Masone v. Gianotti, 388 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976)
(holding the gun to be a dangerous instrument, where a three-year old took a BB
gun from a relative's closet and shot his one-year old brother in the eye, perma-
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rifle, being used as a golf club by an eight-year old, has been
170
held to be a dangerous instrument.
There have been a variety of dangerous instrument claims
since the dangerous instrument exception was proffered by
Nolechek.171 The Nolechek court had the foresight to include
lawnmowers, power tools, and automobiles as instruments that
are "in some contingencies, 'dangerous instruments."' 72 A
chainsaw operated by a seventeen-year-old 73 and fiberglass
boats 174 have been considered dangerous instruments.
76
In contrast, skateboards, 175 a simple plastic doll,
seesaws, 177 and a snowmobile, when operated by a licensed infant, 178 are not considered dangerous instruments. Sexually explicit materials, including magazines and videotapes, are not
considered dangerous instruments, even when shown to an
eleven-year-old. 179 Finally, a "Slip 'n Slide" is not a dangerous
instrument. 8 0 It is important to remember that "[h]arm, unfortunately, comes to children in their play." 15
nently blinding him). See also Lichtenthal, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 268. In Lichtenthal,
the infant plaintiff and the infant defendant, along with three others, were engaged in a "BB gun war." Id. The Appellate Division Fourth Department held
that a cause of action existed against the defendant parent for the negligent entrustment of the BB gun to his son, whom he knew to have a propensity to misuse
the gun. See id.
170. See Gordon, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
171. See, e.g., Young v. Dalidowicz, 460 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1983);
LeSauvage v. Freedman, 419 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1979); Pietrzak v.
McGrath, 445 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981); Alfano v. Marlboro Airport,
445 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981); Adolph E., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 165; Parsons v. Wham-O, Inc., 541 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1989).
172. Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1272. Although the Nolechek court also named
bicycles as dangerous instruments in some contingencies, case law has held that if
an infant has been riding for two years prior to the accident, and that there was no
evidence that the parents were aware that the child might not be able to control
the bike, then that bicycle is not a dangerous instrument. See Santalucia v.
County of Broome, 613 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1994).
173. See Bucholtz v. Grimmer, 376 N.Y.S.2d 277, 278 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1975).
174. See LeSauvage, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.
175. See Young, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
176. See Barocas v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 622 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1995).
177. See Pietrzak, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
178. See Alfano, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
179. See Adolph E., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
180. See Parsons, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
181. Pietrzak, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
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Children Who Destroy Property That Belongs to Others

A. Automatic Liability
The New York Legislature has imposed liability upon the
parents of minors who destroy property under General Obligations Law § 3-112, otherwise known as the Parental Responsibility Act.' 8 2 This statute, in effect, imposes liability of up to
$5,000 upon a parent for the willful, malicious, or unlawful
damage of public or private property by a child between the
ages of ten and eighteen. 8 3 In the past, if the parent had no
182. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112. In relevant part, the statute reads:
1. The parent or legal guardian, other than the state . . . of an infant over
ten and less than eighteen years of age, shall be liable to any public officer,
organization or authority, having by law the care and/or custody of any public property of the state or any political subdivision thereof, or to any private
individual or organization having by law the care, custody and/or ownership
of any private property, for damages caused by such infant, where such infant has willfully, maliciously, or unlawfully damaged, defaced or destroyed
such public property or private property, whether real or personal, or, where
such infant, with intent to deprive the owner and/or custodian of such property or to appropriate the same to himself or herself or to a third person, has
knowingly entered or remained in a building and has wrongfully taken, obtained or withheld such public or private personal property... Such public
officer, organization or authority, or private individual or organization, as
the case may be, may bring an action for civil damages ... to recover such
damages from such parent or legal guardian... In no event shall such damages portion of a judgment authorized by this section. . . exceed the sum of
five thousand dollars.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one ... prior to the entering of a judgment under this section ...the court shall... hear and consider
all evidence of financial hardship presented tending to establish the inability of such parent or legal guardian to pay any or all amount of the sum total
in excess of five hundred dollars ... [tlhe court shall enter the judgment...
in an amount within the financial capacity of such parent or legal guardian,
provided.., no such judgment shall be entered for an amount which is less
than five hundred dollars.
3. It shall be a defense to an action under this section that restitution has
been paid... It shall also be a defense.., that such infant involuntarily and
without good cause abandoned the home of the parent or guardian and without good cause refused to submit to the guidance and control of the parent or
guardian prior to and at the time of the occurrence of such damages ... In
no event shall it be a defense that the parent or legal guardian has exercised
due diligent supervision... however ... in the interests of justice, the court
may consider mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the actions
of the parent or legal guardian in supervising such unemancipated infant

183. See id. at § 3-112(1).

23

464

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:441

indicia of his or her child's hostile propensities, and did not control the child's actions, then a defense could be established.18 4
However, this defense has been abolished, and the remaining
defenses are limited. 8 5 Only restitution and emancipation remain as viable defenses to liability.1 8 6 A plain reading of the
statute 8 7 and interpretative case law indicates that if a parent
does not have physical custody of the child at the time of the
incident, that parent is absolved of liability. 8 8 In addition, a
parent is totally free from liability if the child has made complete restitution. 8 9 While parents' exercise of due diligent supervision over the infant may be considered as a mitigating
factor, it has been struck down as a defense. 190
Essentially, there are two overriding objectives that support this legislative enactment: (I) it creates a limited source of
compensation for property owners who have suffered loss; and
(II) it compels more effective parental supervision of children. 19'
Obviously, an infant cannot answer for his or her wrongful actions financially. Thus, the New York State legislature imposed
liability on parents to answer for their children's actions. 92
B.

Judge Regan Declares the ParentalResponsibility Act a
Bill of Attainder

Despite the aforementioned legislative considerations, the
Parental Responsibility Act has not survived without criticism.
In 1988, Judge Regan of the Rochester City Court penned a
twelve-page opinion holding that the Parental Responsibility
Act violates Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution. 93
184. See Izzo v. Gratton, 383 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (Cohoes City Ct. 1976).
185. See Owens, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
186. See id.
187. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112(3).
188. See Leonard v. O'Neil, 608 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (Justice Ct., Town of Clifton
Park 1994).
189. See A v. B, 468 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1983).
190. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112(3).
191. See A v. B, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (recognizing that the legislature has
deemed the parent's responsibility separate and distinct from the infant's).
192. See id.
193. See Owens, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 516 (holding General Obligations Law § 3112, as presently drafted, violates Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution
because it is, in substantial intent and practical effect, a bill of attainder).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/5

24

2001]

PARENTAL LIABILITY

465

Judge Regan explained that the essential factor for his
finding was that under the statute, the sole predicate for liabil194
ity is the relationship between the parent and his child.
Throughout the 1960s, parental responsibility statutes were introduced in the legislature and were regularly defeated in the
committee or vetoed by former New York Governor Rockefeller. 195 In 1970, the original New York parental liability statute
was created. 96 The amendments made to the statute, which
abolished due diligence as a defense, 97 were enacted by the
Legislature to "coerce a higher level of consciousness in parents
"198

Despite the statute's inherent presumption of constitutionality, Judge Regan held that the statute was unconstitutional.
Judge Regan contrasted the vague powers of a parent to control
children in their "unmanageable adolescence" with an employer's clear authority over an employee. 99 He opined that
parents are defenseless to the liability imposed by the statute,
and, therefore, parents are subjected to punishment solely on
the basis of their blood relationship to the perpetrator. 20 0 As a
result, the bill is, in effect, a bill of attainder in violation of Article I, section 10 of the Constitution. 20 ' He reasoned that parents cannot control the blood relationship to the child, nor can
they argue that they exercised proper supervision despite a
child's destructive conduct. 20 2 Using the Nixon v. Administrator
tests to determine if the punishment element of a bill of attainder was met, Judge Regan contended that the Parental Responsibility Act passed the tests: (1) the statute required traditional
punishments; (2) it generally furthered punitive purposes; and
(3) the Legislature intended to punish when it acted on the
bill.20 3 The Parental Responsibility Act imposes fines and other
194. See id.
195. See id. at 510. For a complete discussion of these efforts, and a summary
of this statute's early history, see John J. Puig, Parental Responsibility in New
York for an Infant's Willful PropertyDamage, 44 ALB. L. REV. 943, 949-50 (1980).
196. See Owens, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
197. See id. at 511.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 513.
200. See id. at 516 (discussing Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)).
201. See Owens, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 515 (discussing Nixon, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)).
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monetary penalties that are clearly within the confines of
"traditional punishment" and the statute's punitive purposes
are furthered by the levying of financial penalties. 2 4 Finally,
the New York legislature intended the statute to be "both re205
criminatory and punitive."
Judge Regan found support for his theory of unconstitutionality in the case of Corley v. Lewless. 20 6 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held a similar statute unconstitutional and particularly violative of the Due Process Clause of
the Federal Constitution. 20 7 Specifically, the Corley court said
that "[t]o allow any recovery on the basis stated by the statute
would deprive the defendant of property without due process of
law, would authorize a recovery without liability, and would
compel payment without fault."208 However, several other
states, including New Jersey, 20 9 Maryland, 210 and Ohio, 21' have
upheld the constitutionality of state statutes providing for
mandatory parental liability for the misbehavior of minor
children.
VI.

TERROR IN COLUMBINE - WHO IS LIABLE?

A. Applicable New York Case Law
On April 20, 1999, at 11:19 in the morning, Eric Harris and
his "Trenchcoat Mafia" partner, Dylan Klebold, walked into Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado bent on destruction.21 2 The duo carried with them a 9 mm carbine, a modified
Tech 9 semiautomatic rifle, and two sawed-off shotguns. 21 3 They
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. 182 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971).
207. See Corley, 182 S.E.2d at 770 (holding that Georgia Code Annotated
§ 105-113 (1966) violated state and federal due process). This statute stated that
"a parent or other person in loco parentis having the custody and control over a
minor child or children under the age of 17 shall be liable for the willful and wanton acts of said minor child .... " Id. at 768.
208. Id. at 770 (quoting Lloyd Adams v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 10 S.E.2d 46, 51
(Ga. 1940)).
209. See Board of Educ. of Piscataway Township, 431 A.2d at 805.
210. See In re William George T., 599 A.2d at 890.
211. See Rudnay, 374 N.E.2d at 175.
212. See Gwen Florio, et al., Scattered Warning Signs Pointed to Colorado
Rampage, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, May 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9671005.
213. See id.
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had already rigged the school with almost thirty propane-tank
bombs. 2 14 In all, officials eventually discovered forty-eight carbon dioxide bombs and twenty-seven pipe bombs, along with
several other incendiary devices. 2 15 Armed with these weapons,
the two rushed into Columbine High and opened fire on their
fellow classmates. After the rampage, twelve students and a
teacher had been slain, twenty-three students were wounded,
and the assassins had both committed suicide. 216 Under New
York law would the parents of the assassins be civilly liable to
the parents of the deceased?
An application of the case law interpreted previously in this
article 217 sheds light on whether the Harrises and the Kiebolds
would be found liable under New York law for their sons' nihilistic actions. Although much is still unknown about the circumstances surrounding the Littleton tragedy, the facts used were
taken from the research that has been conducted up until the
drafting of this comment. These facts are presented as the most
reliable sources at the time of this writing and are not purported to be true.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the
Klebolds could possibly be liable to the Columbine School District under the Parental Responsibility Act, New York General
Obligations Law § 3-112.218 The Klebold parents would be liable for the damage done by their seventeen-year old son Dylan
to the public property of the state, consisting primarily of the
damage wreaked by the pipe bombs and bullets. The Klebolds'
liability for the property would be limited to $5,000,219 and they
could try to demonstrate financial hardship for any of the liability over $500.220 Since the defense of emancipation or restitution could not be used, financial hardship would be the best
mitigating factor available to the Klebolds. 221 On the contrary,
214. See id.; see also Matt Bai, Anatomy of a Massacre (Columbine High
School Shootings), NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, at 25.

215.
14, 2000,
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See Peggy Lowe, Columbine Was Packed With Bombs, DENVER
at 1A.
See Bai, supra note 214, at 25.
See supra Parts II-V.
See supra Part V.
See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112(1).
See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112(2).
See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.

POST,

Feb.
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Eric Harris' parents would not be liable for any of this damage
because Eric was eighteen at the time of the shootings, 222 and,
223
therefore, outside the reach of the statute.
The larger issue in the case, however, involves assessing
the various wrongful-death lawsuits that are pending against
the parents of the two killers. 224 The parents of slain Columbine student Isaiah Shoels have filed a $250 million wrongful
death lawsuit against the Harrises and the Klebolds. 225 The local district attorney in Jefferson County has also not ruled out
226
bringing formal charges against the parents.
The general rule in New York is that there is no parental
liability for the torts of minors. 227 In the Littleton situation, it
is important to remember the policy reasons behind Holodook.
The Holodook court recognized that parental supervision is a
matter for the exercise of judgment;228 that people come from
varied backgrounds, and this affects the way parents bring up
their child. 229 The New York courts are reluctant to intrude
upon parents' rights to bring up their children as they see fit.
At some point, though, the parents must be accountable for the
actions of their children, especially if they are particularly
230
aware of dangerous conduct.
New York law will not hold parents liable for neighborhood
fights when the parents do not have extensive knowledge of
their child's previous conduct. In similar situations, the nonliability case law is broad enough to excuse freak incidents of a
child's behavior. However, New York courts will impose liabil222. See Jim Henderson, Killers Gave Off Warning Signals, But Few in Littleton Took Notice, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 25, 1999, at 21A.
223. Paragraph 1 of § 3-112 states: "The parent... of an infant over ten and
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3less than eighteen years of age, shall be liable .
112(1).
224. See Leonard Pitts Jr., Editorial, Columbine Families Won't Find Answers
in Lawsuits, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 26019906
(reporting that there are as many as eighteen such lawsuits, as of the date of the
article).
225. See Sole Black Columbine Victim's Parents Plan to Move to Houston,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 15, 1999, at 42A.
226. See Columbine Killers Wanted Screen Immortality, THE MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 13, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 21557640.
227. See supra Part III.B; see also, e.g., Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346.
228. See supra note 96-98 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 97.

230. See Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1273.
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ity where the parents have given their children dangerous instruments, or where they have been put on notice that their
child is a repeat offender. This is only fair to protect innocent
third parties that may be injured.
There is no evidence that the Columbine assassins were
given the artillery by their parents. 231 Robyn Anderson, a
friend of Klebold's, went with Dylan and Eric to a local gun
show and bought three of the four guns the two used in the rampage. 232 However, federal and state prosecutors agree that it
was not illegal for Robyn, an eighteen year-old, to buy guns in a
233
private sale which did not require a background check.
Twenty-two year-old Mark Manes recently pled guilty to supplying a weapon to a minor, specifically, a TEC-DC9 that Harris
and Klebold used in their rampage. 234 Phillip Duran, twentythree, pled guilty to the same charges on May 8, 2000.235 Without evidence of the parents' involvement in or knowledge of
these transactions, it would be impossible to base parental liability upon the entrustment of the weapons to the children.
Therefore, the two Steinberg situations that require entrust2 36
ment would not impose liability on Eric and Dylan's parents.
There are essentially two theories of parental negligence
under New York law that apply here: (1) the breach of parental
duty to third parties to protect them from their infant's improvident use of a dangerous instrument when the parents are aware
of and capable of controlling the instrument's use, as held in
231. See Steven K. Paulson, Clues to Massacre Sought on Tape, GREENSBORO
NEWS & RECORD, Apr. 24, 1999, at Al.
232. See Mike Soraghan, Colorado After Columbine, The Gun Debate, STATE
LEGISLATURES, June 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 15407418.
233. See id.
234. See Columbine Shooters Made Tapes, Brief Transcriptof Video Will Be
Read at Man's Sentencing, THE GAZETTE, Nov. 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL
30082519.
235. See Sue Lindsay, Columbine Gun Middleman Pleads Guilty for His Role,
DENVER RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 6595783.
236.
(2) Where a parent is negligent in intrusting to the child an instrument
which, because of its nature, use, and purpose, is so dangerous as to constitute, in the hands of a child, an unreasonable risk to others; [(3)] where a
parent is negligent in intrusting to the child an instrumentality which,
though not necessarily a dangerous thing of itself, is likely to be put to a
dangerous use because of the known propensities of the child ....
Steinberg, 293 N.Y.S. at 149.
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Nolechek, and (2) the Steinberg court's imputation of liability to
parents because of their negligence in failing to reasonably restrain the child from vicious conduct that imperils others, when
the parents know of the child's propensities.
Parental liability could be imposed, if it could be shown
that the parents were "aware of and capable of controlling"
their sons' use of the weapons. 237 As previously discussed, the
New York Court of Appeals in Nolechek v. Gesuale highlighted
the duty parents owe to third parties to control their children's
use of dangerous instruments. 238 Under Nolechek, parents who
have negligently permitted an infant to use a dangerous instrument have breached "an established duty to third parties who
may be harmed. ' 239 In order to impose liability upon the Harrises and the Klebolds under Nolechek, it is paramount to establish that they negligently permitted Eric and Dylan to use the
dangerous instruments. The question then is: Were the parents aware of and capable of controlling Eric and Dylan's use of
those weapons?
To find the parents liable under Nolechek would strain a
reasonable interpretation of the facts. Nolechek and its progeny
demonstrate that there must be a negligent entrustment of a
dangerous instrument. 240 In order to demonstrate this, plaintiffs in a wrongful-death action would have to show that Eric
and Dylan's parents entrusted them with the weapons. This is
a burden that the plaintiffs cannot meet. Reports indicate that
24 1
the Harrises and the Klebolds were "normal" households.
However, commentators have questioned how the parents could
be ignorant of the two boys' building bombs and stocking an ar242
senal in their homes.
Analytically, the Nolechek exception to Holodook focuses on
whether the parents were aware of and capable of controlling
237. Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1272.
238. See id. at 1273.
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Adolph E., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 166; Parsons, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 45;
Young, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
241. See Jeff Kass, Portraitof Two Teens Reveals a Lot of Gray, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, May 3, 1999, at 3; see also Dale Russakoff, et al., In Littleton,
Neighbors Ponder What Went Wrong, WASHINGTON POST, May 2, 1999, at A20.
242. See Gregory Freeman, ParentsMust Stay in Touch With Their Children,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 2, 1999, at D3.
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the use of the dangerous instrument. The "awareness and capable of controlling" threshold in Nolechek is a higher standard to
meet than Steinberg's "negligent failure to restrain when the
parent knows of the child's propensity" standard. For Nolechek
liability to be established, the parents must exhibit a modicum
of control over their children's use of the dangerous instrument.
Awareness of the child's use of the instrument is a demanding
standard - Columbine plaintiffs would have to demonstrate
that Eric and Dylan's parents were "aware" that their children
owned the weapons that were used in the attack and were capable of controlling Eric and Dylan's use of the instruments. 243 To
put it bluntly, it seems doubtful that anyone could control these
two children.
Under Steinberg, liability can be imposed on parents in situations where they reasonably fail to restrain their child from
vicious conduct that endangers others, when they have knowledge of their child's propensities. 244 Under Steinberg, the plaintiffs would not have to substantiate that the parents were
aware or capable of controlling Eric and Dylan's use of the
weapons, nor show entrustment. Instead, a lighter burden
must be shouldered - that Eric and Dylan's parents were negligent, because they failed to restrain the children from vicious
conduct that imperils others. The plaintiffs would also have to
prove that the parents knew of their child's propensity to act
viciously in a way that endangers others. Obviously, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold engaged in vicious conduct which endangered others. It is also a foregone conclusion that the parents of
these two failed to restrain them from this vicious conduct.
Their actions have been called "[an inexplicable slaughter of
innocents by two disturbed, nihilistic and unfathomably wicked
young men." 245 The only question left to be answered under
Steinberg is: Did the Harrises and the Klebolds have knowledge
of their children's propensities?

243. See supra notes 136-41.
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. Pitts, supra note 224.

31

472

B.

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:441

Did the Harrisesand the Klebolds Have Sufficient
Knowledge of Their Sons' Propensities to Impute
Liability Under Steinberg?
1.

What did teachers and administratorsknow?

There are several people who are integral in determining
what the Harrises and the Klebolds knew of the boys' dispositions. Teachers, administrators, neighbors, employees, friends,
and the justice system could all opine as to whether the boys'
parents knew or should have known of their propensities.
Under New York case law, knowledge of an infant's use of dangerous instruments can be imputed to parents, despite their
profession of ignorance. 246 In these instances, circumstantial
evidence plays a large part in determining liability, as evi247
denced by the Kuchlik decision.
The group Eric and Dylan belonged to, the "Trenchcoat Mafia," was a loose organization of social outcasts at Columbine.
The principal of Columbine High, Frank DeAngelis, denies having ever heard of the "Trenchcoat Mafia" until after the shootings. 248 He also claimed that no one had ever informed him that

anyone was harassing Klebold or Harris in school. 249 The Jefferson County Superintendent of Schools also denies ever having heard of the group. 250 However, this is not the first time
that a "Trenchcoat Mafia" member has been involved in a killing. In 1997, an alleged member and Columbine senior, Robert
Craig, killed his stepfather and then shot himself to death. 251
For a video production class, Eric and Dylan made a tape
that depicted an assassination in which they shot the school's
"jocks."252 A couple of their
sions. 253 On one occasion, one

videos depicted fires and explo-

of the boys' writings was brought

246. See Kuchlik, 267 N.Y.S. at 259 (quoting Woloszynowski v. New York
Cent. R.R. Co., 172 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930)); see also discussion supra notes 14551.
247. See id. at 258.
248. David K. Li, Cops Have New Suspect Who Says Others Helped, NEW
YORK POST, April 24, 1999, at 6.
249. See John Cloud & Andrew Goldstein, Could He Have Done More?, TIME,
Dec. 20, 1999, at 48.
250. See Henderson, supra note 222, at 21A.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See Florio, supra note 212.
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to the attention of the guidance counselor because of its graphic
violence. 254 An essay that Klebold wrote for an English class
portrayed a protagonist clad in a black trenchcoat with a duffel
bag, brutally executing "college preps. '' 25 5 One particular
teacher, Cheryl Lucas, claimed that she and a few others had
warned the administration that Eric and Dylan were potentially violent students, based on stories they had written about
hate and death. 256 In addition, a parent of one of the Columbine
victims had complained to school authorities about the boys, alleging they were "dangerous racists." 257 Some teachers also
knew about Eric's web site where he posted a message that
stated: "God, I can't wait till I can kill you people ... All I want
258
to do is kill as many of you as I can."
2.

What did friends know?

Friends had noticed that Eric and Dylan were slipping into
"their own eerie world" just before the shootings. 259 As members of the "Trenchcoat Mafia," the two were enamored of Nazi
culture. 260 They wore swastikas and quoted German literature. 261 An ex-girlfriend of Eric's once found him sprawled on
the ground by a large rock with fake blood spattered around
262
him, making the scene look like an attempted suicide.
Friends knew that Eric had begun experimenting at home with
pipe bombs; 263 co-workers knew that he enjoyed making "dry ice
bombs" and other miniature exploding devices. 264 Yet, the boys'
supervisor at a pizza parlor said they were two of his best employees, 265 and that neither boy gave any "outward indication
254. See Bai, supra note 214, at 27.
255. See Dave Cullen, Columbine Myths Debunked, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov.
26, 2000, available at 2000 WL 6706554.
256. See Henderson, supra note 222, at 21A.
257. See Bai, supra note 214, at 31.
258. Henderson, supra note 222, at 21A.
259. Id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See Tom Rhodes, Murderous Revenge of the Trenchcoat Misfits, SUNDAY
TIMES LONDON, April 25, 1999, § 4G, at 26.
263. See Florio, supra note 212.
264. See Rhodes, supra note 262, at 26.
265. See Kass, supra note 241, at 3.
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that this kind of tragedy could take place." 266 However, the
owner of the pizza shop was recently named as a defendant in a
lawsuit, and he is claimed to have "created 'a work environment
that included ...detonation of dry ice bombs, handling of gun
powder, numerous fires, pyrotechnic explosions, discussions of
killing and the display of bombs"' and that he knew Harris and
Klebold were playing with pipe bombs. 267
3.

What did the authorities know?

The boys had a run-in with the police; in 1998, the two were
arrested for stealing tools out of a van. 268 They went through a
court-ordered diversion program, including weekly visits to a
"diversion officer" as well as several reform programs, including
"anger-management class." 269 One of the diversion program's
requirements was that the two stay out of trouble, but, in
March of 1998, Rudy and Judy Brown filed a complaint against
Harris saying that he had threatened their son, was making
pipe bombs, and had posted a violent web site. 270 Unlike the
parents in Armour v. England, who were found not to have
known about their child's propensities, Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold's parents had obviously been notified of their children's
1
conduct. 27
4.

What did the parents know?

The facts of Columbine may be more similar to Staruck v.
County of Otsego,272 discussed above, where the State, in loco
parentis,had extensive knowledge of the infant defendant's disciplinary problems. 273 However, the Court in Staruck concluded
that, even if the State knew the child to be a delinquent, the
266. See Florio, supra note 212.
267. See Mike McPhee, 4 Added to Columbine Lawsuits, DENVER POST, Dec.
30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25838558.
268. See Russakoff, supra note 241, at A20.
269. See Bai, supra note 214, at 26.
270. See Valerie Richardson, Columbine Shooting Shadows Election: Publicity
Not a Plus for Candidate,THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 29, 2000, at A4.
271. In Armour, the defendant parents' key contention was that no one, including school officials, had notified them of any violent conduct. See Armour, 619
N.Y.S.2d at 808; see also supra note 41 and acompanying text.
272. 138 N.Y.S.2d 385 (App. Div. 3d Dep't. 1955); see also supra notes 31-36
and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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proof in the case must have indicated to a reasonable mind that
the defendant would actually shoot someone. 274 For example,
the defendant parents in Adolph E. v. Linda M. were aware
that their daughter had engaged in a polymorphously perverse
game with her younger brothers.27 5 However, the Appellate Division Second Department held that, even if the parents had
such knowledge, this would not put them on notice that their
daughter would engage in any harmful sexual conduct with the
plaintiffs child, for whom she babysat. 276 Similarly, eight years
later in Sherri v. Gerwell, the same court required the plaintiffs
to demonstrate that the defendant parent had specific knowl277
edge of her son's propensity to use cars without permission,
or to steal or borrow items that he was unauthorized to use, in
order to impose parental liability.2 78 Thus, it seems that New
York courts have required plaintiffs to show that defendant parents had very particular knowledge of their child's aberrant behavior. The information provided by Columbine teachers or
students in the previous sections only facilitate a general notion
of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold's antisocial behavior. This
would be insufficient under New York law; the knowledge that
the parents would have had to possess must be refined and specific. It does not appear that the Klebolds and the Harrises
were on notice that their children would try to kill someone. Or
were they?
Randy and Judy Brown, parents of Columbine student
Brooks Brown, had reported Eric Harris to the police a year
prior to the shooting.2 7 9 Harris had thrown a chunk of ice
through Brooks' car windshield. 28 0 The parents also found Harris' web site where he allegedly threatened to kill Brooks and
encouraged others wishing to kill someone to consider Brooks as
a target. 28 ' Mrs. Brown took her complaint directly to the Harrises, who were reportedly upset with the news. 28 2 Pursuant to
274. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See Adolph E., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
See id.
Sherri, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
See id.
See Henderson, supra note 222, at 21A.
See id.
See id.
See Russakoff, supra note 241, at A20.
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Linder v. Bidner, discussed above, that the Harrises possessed
knowledge of this incident might make them liable under New
York law for the actions of their son. 283 In Linder, it was alleged that neighbors had frequently notified the defendant par28 4
ents of their child's vicious habit of beating up other children.
This was found sufficient to charge the parents with knowledge
of their son's conduct. 285 Therefore, according to Linder, the
Brown incident may qualify as actual parental notification.
The Court of Appeals' language in LaTorre v. Genesee Management is especially telling: "[siome knowledge of a specific
type of pertinently dangerous characteristics and particularly
forseeable conduct might find a theoretical tort construct to
support recognition for some liability."28 6 The Harrises were
put on notice that their son wanted Brooks Brown dead, and
they saw the violent messages the Browns downloaded from
Eric's web site. New York precedent exists for the proposition
that if neither parent is aware nor cognizant of his child's possession of a dangerous instrument, then parental knowledge is
insufficient. 287 In Brahm v. Hatch, a previously benign defendant effectuated a quadruple-homicide of his father and girlfriend, his brother, and his cousin. 28 8 The deceased father had
allegedly told a friend, who testified at trial, that he wouldn't be
surprised if the defendant would one day take a gun and
"sho[olt whoever was around him." 289 Despite this evidence, the
court found the defendant's administratrix non-negligent. 290 In
their defense, the Harrises could argue along the lines of the
reasoning in Brahm that they were neither aware nor cognizant
of Eric's violent tendencies. Is it possible that the parents did
not know?
The final damning piece of evidence against the Harrises is
the alleged fact that police found a sawed-off shotgun and pipe
bomb materials in plain view in Eric Harris' room, 291 and a
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
See Linder, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
See id. at 430.
LaTorre, 687 N.E.2d at 1287.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See Brahm v. Hatch, 609 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1994).
See id. at 958.
See id.
See Bai, supra note 214, at 31.
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taped admission by Harris that his father had found a pipe
bomb in his room. 292 On a tape released to the media, Harris
says: "Thank God my parents [didn't] search my room. They
would have found so much s--. . .. 293 Both boys venture, on
tape, that their plans might have been diffused if their parents
had been more curious. 294 Police also recovered a diary detailing the assassins' plans for the massacre, including calculations
295
as to the time of day that would produce the most deaths.
Tapes reveal that Harris had an arsenal right in his room. He
had his desk drawers filled with bomb-making material, and his
296
closet was replete with combat knives, guns, and gunpowder.
VII.

CONCLUSION - THE VERDICT

The cumulative amount of information available to the
Harrises could very well impute liability to them under New
York law. Using a Steinberg analysis, it appears that the Harrises, knowing of Eric's propensities, failed to reasonably restrain him from vicious conduct that endangered others.
Certainly the Internet death threats to Brown and the bombmaking material in Eric's room would have given the Harrises
sufficient parental knowledge to engender liability, similar to
the mother's knowledge in Agnesini v. Olsen. As in Linder v.
Bidner, the complaints of neighbors (the Browns) fell on deaf
ears, and there is a viable cause of action under these facts. Although the New York courts have required increasingly specific
parental knowledge, 297 it is reasonable to assume that the Harrises were well aware of Eric's propensities. The Court of Appeals' recent decision in LaTorre v. Genesee Management held
that the plaintiffs must allege and plead parental negligence
with some reasonable specificity. 298 Plaintiffs in a wrongfuldeath suit against the Harrises have plenty of red flags that
292. See Lynn Bartels, Columbine Killer's Videotape Reveals His Bedroom
Concealed an Arsenal, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 16, 1999, at 1.
293. Id.
294. See Columbine ParentsProtest Showing of Tapes to Magazine, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 1999, at Al.

295. See Bai, supra note 214, at 31.
296. See Columbine Parents Protest,supra note 294.
297. See, e.g., Sherri, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 145; see also supra notes 44-63; Adolph
E., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
298. See LaTorre, 687 N.E.2d at 1286.
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they could point to in order to plead properly under this standard. Eric Harris' blatant conduct, including keeping weapons
in his bedroom, and making overt death threats, combine to put
the parents on notice.
It may also come to light that Dylan Klebold's parents
knew as much as the Harrises about their own son's behavior.299
There is evidence that one of Dylan's teachers met with a guidance counselor and Dylan's parents to discuss a graphically violent essay he wrote where a "protagonist in a black trench coat
with a duffel bag brutally execut[ed] 'college preps."' 30 0 However, dealing with the facts presented, this author does not believe that the Klebolds would be found negligent under
applicable New York case law. It appears that most of the
weapons were kept in the Harris household, and Eric was much
more blatant with his violent threats than Dylan. There is no
record of Dylan's having made death threats, nor does it appear
that the Klebolds were specifically informed of Dylan's conduct.
EPILOGUE
Shortly after the Columbine shootings, New York Governor
George Pataki proposed new legislation to combat school violence, and the Senate passed it within two days. 301 Former
President Clinton proposed federal anti-gun legislation that
would make it possible for parents to be charged with a felony if
their children commit crimes with guns. 30 2 Likewise, Colorado
and other states have tightened their legislation on gun control
30 3
recently.
299. Author's note: This article was written in November 1999 and submitted
for publication in February 2001.
300. Cullen, supra note 255.
301. See Rush to Fix It: National Trauma Inevitably Inspires a Wave of Bad
Lawmaking, HERALD AMERICAN, May 2, 1999, at D2.
302. See Nancy Churnin, Who's Responsible?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4,
1999, available at 1999 WL 4118021.
303. For example, Colorado legislators approved bills that make "straw
purchases" (where a gun buyer fronts for a minor or someone with a criminal background) illegal, and a bill that requires parental permission before someone who
has legally obtained a firearm (i.e., Robyn Anderson) gives it to someone underage
(i.e., Klebold and Harris). See Jennifer Hamilton, Owens Signs Gun Control Legislation, THE GAZETTE, May 20, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 19081089. Furthermore,
there is a new Colorado law that requires background checks on every gun show
sale in the state. See David Olinger, Gun Vendors Come Forward,DENVER POST,
Nov. 22, 2000, at 13A. Arkansas passed a law last year that makes parents respon-
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In the wake of the Columbine shootings, as mentioned earlier, there was a proliferation of wrongful death suits filed
against the parents of Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris. In addition, victim's families have filed suits against the Sheriffs office, Sheriff John Stone, seven Sheriffs officers and the former
Sheriff.30 4 The two men who sold Anderson the guns at the gun
show, the gun-show operator, and the owner of the pizza shop
where Harris and Klebold worked have also been named as defendants in civil lawsuits. 3 5 Klebold's creative-writing teacher,
Judy Kelly, has also been named as a defendant in a lawsuit
claiming that she was warned of the attack by a graphically violent essay that Klebold wrote. 30 6 In an interesting turn of
events, on November 5, 1999, the parents of Dylan Klebold filed
notice of their intention to sue Littleton Sheriff John Stone. 30 7
The parents are alleging that Stone knew that Eric Harris was
30 8
a disturbed young man, and that he did not inform them.
The Klebolds contend that, if he had, they would have forbidden
their son, Dylan, from associating with Harris. 30 9 310

sible for minors who possess firearms on school property. See Soraghan, supra
note 232. Rhode Island passed a law in 1999 that prohibits a person from giving
ammunition and firearms to minors, with or without parental consent. See id.
304. See Sheriffs Office Argues to Dismiss 5 Columbine Suits, DENVER POST,
Aug. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25825865.
305. See McPhee, supra note 267.
306. See Cullen, supra note 255.
307. See Pitts, supra note 224.
308. See id.
309. See id.
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